THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGIN OF FEDERALISM

THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGIN OF FEDERALISM

INTRODUCTION

This unit is an attempt to trace the origin of federalism through the works of renowned scholars in the field. It is made clear that prior to the adoption of the federal system in the United States of America through the works of James Madison, Alexander

Hamilton and John Jay. Ancient scholars had provided intellectual backings for a political arrangement in which there would be a minimum of two layers of government, in a coordinate relationship. However, there are variations in the

scholars’ proposed methods of coordinate relationship between the two layers.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the conclusion of this unit, students should be able to:

- Explain the origin of federalism

- Discuss the various phases in the development of federalism

- Identify each scholars’ contributions to the development of federalism

Scholarly Contributions

It may be argued that the main motivation for some of the early studies carried out on federalism was to seek alternative arrangements for centralised states because of the 19 weaknesses inherent in the arrangement of centrality. Johannes Althusius (1557–1630) is generally reputed as the father of modern federalist thought, because of his evergreen work, Politica Methodice Digesta (Althusius 1603) where he argued for the autonomy of Emdem. This was a period when such thoughts were against the authorities of the Lutheran provincial Lord and the Catholic Emperor. Johannes Althusius’ position at the time was motivated by the positions of the French

Huguenots and the Calvinist teachings. As a permanent minority in several states, Calvinists developed a doctrine of resistance as the right and duty of “natural leaders” to resist tyranny. Essentially, mainstream Calvinists insisted on sovereignty in the

social circles, to be only subordinated to God’s injunctions. On the other hand, The French Protestant Huguenots developed a theory of legitimacy. The theory is based on the principle that a people (as composed in politically delineated territories) have Godgiven rights to resist rulers whose authorities and legitimacy can be questioned. In this respect, Althusius jettisoned theocratic dictates for a non-sectarian, non-religious contractualist political theory of federations that prohibited state intervention even for

purposes of promoting the right faith. Significantly, the “accommodation of dissent and diversity prevailed over any interest in subordinating political powers to religion or vice versa”. Althusius’ position on the acceptable political arrangement within any political entity is based on the principle of living together in mutual benevolence. This is derived

from the fact that the mutual interdependent nature of man brings about desired comfort. Thus, it is apparent that the claims of the collectives to legitimacy and political power is derived from the interconnected and interwoven relationships among them, rather than individualistic autonomy. Each collective however claims “autonomy within its own sphere against intervention by other associations”. Deriving from this intellectual tradition, other scholars attempted variations of federal political orders, mainly as a political association aimed at accommodating diversities, while also being a tool for resolving inter-state conflicts. Arguably the first effort in this respect is Ludolph Hugo’s work (De Statu Regionum Germanie, 1661),  where the20 distinguished confederations based on alliances, decentralized unitary states such as the Roman Empire, and federations, characterized by ‘double governments’ with territorial division of powers. A similar argument was put forward by Baron de Montesquieu, in the classic work

The Spirit of Laws where the author presented the case for confederal arrangements as a combination of the best of small and large political units, without the disadvantages of either. In effect, in one extreme, they could provide the advantages of small states such as republican participation and liberty understood as non-domination, which

institutionalizes the tenets of security against abuse of power. At the other extreme, confederal orders secure the benefits of larger states such as military security, without the risks of small and  large states. The author concludes thus: “A ‘confederate republic’ with separation of powers allows sufficient homogeneity and identification within sufficiently small member units. The member units in turn pool powers

sufficient to secure external security, reserving the right to secede. Member units serve as checks on each other, since other

member units may intervene to quell insurrection and power

abuse in one member unit”.This arrangement is partly reflected in the planning of the setting-up of the European Union. A different perspective to an appropriate political arrangement was presented by David Hume who counters the notion that smaller size is better. The author submits that, “in a large democracy … there is compass and room enough to refine the democracy”. In his work, Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth, Hume’s recommendation focuses on a federal arrangement for deliberation of laws involving both member unit and central legislatures. The component units are bestowed with various powers, including partaking in decision-making at the centre. However, their laws and court judgments can be overruled by the powerful centre. In such geographically large 21 systems, there are better chances of protecting the decision-making process from the intrigue, passion and subjectivity that could go against public interest.